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            Abstract. The motivation of this article is to induce the bank capital management       
            solution for banks and regulation bodies on commercial banks.  The goal of the paper   
            is intended to mitigate the risk of a banking area and also provide the right incentive  
            for banks to support the real economy. 
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Part I Introduction 
 
In Europe, after the Basel 1 (1988) accord, the banking supervision Accords in 
Basel, Switzerland, Basel 2 (1999) and Basel 3 (2010) have been evolved.  The issuer, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), advised about credit risk 
(1988.07) at the Basel 1 and amended about market risk (1996.01) with the Basel 1 
Amendment.  In the revised framework of the Basel 2, operational risk (2004.06) was 
introduced and enhanced at the Basel 3 (2010.12).  In this overall perspective, these 
Basel Capital Rules have been enhanced up to the Basel 3.  For example, the scope of 
operational risk is enlarged.  This requires some reasonable motivation since banks face 
the situation to manage the cost to follow banking capital regulation rules.  Of particular 
significance is that the government needs to regulate banks to prevent panic from the 
systemic banking crisis. 
Much interest has been aroused in cascading failure of bank run prevention.  For 
example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) observe large costs imposed on the economy of 
United States caused by bank runs in the 1930s.  Upon on much more recent data, in 
systemically important banking crises of the world from 1970 to 2007, the average net 
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recapitalization cost to the government was 6% of GDP (Gross Domestic product).  
Fiscal costs associated with crisis management were averaged 13% for GDP (16% of GDP 
if expense recoveries are ignored), and economic output losses were averaged about 20% 
of GDP during the first four years of the crisis.  Otherwise, if the government decides to 
adopt the Basel capital regulation framework, the adoption cost will influence the 
economy of countries.  Either households or banks, related parties to economy should pay 
for the Basel capital regulation as the preventive method in the banking business cycle.  
An OECD (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) study 
released on 17 February 2011, estimated that the medium-term impact of the Basel III 
implementation on GDP growth would be in the range of 0.05% to 0.15% per year.  
Economic output would be mainly affected by increase in banks’ lending spreads, as 
banks pass a rise in bank funding costs, due to higher capital requirements, to their 
customers.  Therefore, the situation is that banks are struggling to manage the regulation 
cost and the government wants to defend about nationwide contagion of other banks. 
 
Part II The macro-prudential approach to financial regulation covering on-
balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet (OBS) 
 
Insofar as systemic risk is concerned, risks that firms, households and reserve 
banks and commercial banks face are highly linked to each other.  Seen from this point 
of view, the banking industry and the monetary policy have particular relevance to 
systemic risk.  Undoubtedly, it goes without saying that financial contagion problems 
through international banks should be measured in the manner of systemic risk 
management. With the macro-prudential approach, it is highly probable that systemic 
risk is explained by the static model of the general equilibrium.  Because on-balance-
sheet and off-balance-sheet (OBS) risks are structurally segmented annually or 
periodically by financial statements containing the balance sheet.  Even though domino 
effects or contagions can be understood as movements having the future tendency to 
figure out solutions toward the future, scope of regulation should be articulated by 
categorization of on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet  (OBS) risks in the static model.  
Thus the macro-prudential approach to financial regulation covering on-balance-sheet 
and off-balance-sheet (OBS) risks is intimately linked with the general equilibrium (GE) 
approach. 
On-balance-sheet risks are presented in a fourfold manner and are divided into 
credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and systemic risk.  Assets of banks have credit risk 
and market risk.  Credit risk is the risk that a borrower will default on any type of debt 
by failing to make required payments.  Market risk is the risk of losses in positions 
arising from movements in market prices.  In case of liquidity risk, there are two major 
situations.  One is emergency capacity of banks.  When an illiquidity event takes place, 
an affected bank typically must borrow funds at interest rates exceeding those paid by 
other institutions.  Another is about the stability of the banking system in case of 
inducing a large number of depositors to seek withdrawals.  I would say liquidity risk in 
regard of demand deposit is on-the-balance-sheet risks of banks.  Credit, market and 
liquidity risk are portrayed in considerable individual details but systemic risk is negative 
externality or adverse spillover effect stemming from transaction in which they were not 
participants.  Distinguished from credit risk containing sovereign risk (government risk), 
counterparty risk (unincorporated entities’ risk exposed to financial risk, usually 
referring to governments, national banks), systemic risk is the risk of collapse of an 
entire financial system or the entire  market, as opposed to risk associated  with any 
individual entity, group or component of a system.  George G. Kaufman and Kenneth 
E. Scott (2003) define “systemic risk” in imprecise terms as below: 
”Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, 
as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components, and is evidenced by co-
movements (correlations) among most or all the parts.” 
Darryll Hendricks (2009), who is a practitioner, suggests a more theoretical 
definition from sciences in which the term originated: 
“A systemic risk is the risk of a phase transition from one equilibrium to 
another, much less optimal equilibrium, characterized by multiple self-reinforcing 
feedback mechanisms making it difficult to reverse.” 
Banks engage in a number of activities that yield income, entail expenses and 
manage risks from on-balance-sheet risks to off-balance-sheet risks.  Depending on bank 
characteristics, Banks extend loan commitments, security loans and trade derivative 
securities.  Through extended loan commitments, the borrower has a guarantee of 
 
 
 
Figure  II.1 Vanhoose  2008 - Asset/Liability of banks 
 
credit at a given interest rate  whenever  desired during  the specific period.  The bank 
receives interest income on the portion of the credit line that the borrower draws upon, 
and the bank receives non-interest income on the unused portion.  Whereas a loan 
commitment obligates a bank to bring a loan onto its balance sheet upon customers’ 
requests, securitization permits a bank to remove loans from a balance sheet.  Trading 
derivative securities also proved to be significant source of revenues.  This claim is 
supported by the survey of David Van Hoose (2010), by the end of 2008, United States 
banks held a notional amount of derivatives totally more than 190 trillion dollar, of which 
about 150 trillion dollar of derivatives’ exposure was comprised of interest rate contracts. 
In relation to what I have previously said, the general equilibrium (GE) approach 
is useful to understand the overall mechanism of financial transaction and economic 
policy.  The opposite mechanism of assets and liabilities on bank characteristic in the 
figure II.1, is different from usual balance sheets of firms.  That is, banks regardless of 
central banks or commercial banks have characteristic that loans are assets of banks and 
deposits are liabilities. 
 
 
 
                                          Figure  II.2 Freixas-Rochet (1999) 
 
 
All of these figures are emphasized by capital circulation of the Freixas-Rochet model 
(1999) in the figure II.2.  In conjunction with the Freixas-Rochet model, the equilibrium 
is detected with the general equilibrium approach with direct relevance to circulation of 
securities and stability of deposits.  In the paper, the general equilibrium approach is 
upgraded with an adroit mixture of the balance sheet concept evaluating the value of 
economic entities and the income statement concept considering the profit to support the 
existence of financial entities. 
 
Part III Model 
 
1.  Saving preference of Consumers 
 
A microeconomic theory of banks had not been existed before the microeconomic 
foundation related to banks in the early 1970s.  I would suggest add a banking sector at 
the Arrow general equilibrium model (1953) under the complete financial market 
assumption. The main purpose of the model has been to explore solutions about the 
problem of households, firms, banks and regulation bodies. 
The two-period model (t=0,1,2) with a unique physical good initially owned by 
consumers in the economy in which a continuum of ex-ante identical agents is each 
endowed with one unit of goods at the period t=0, and this good is to be consumed at 
each period of t=1 and t=2. The consumer chooses her consumption profile (C1, C2) and the 
allocation of her savings S between bank deposits Dh and securities sPsBs
h
, in a way that 
maximize her utility function  under her budget constraints:  
 
Max (C1, C2) 
C1 +  sPsBs
h  
+ D
h 
+ Sh - sPsBs
h
 – Dh = W1 
C2 = f +b+(1+r) sPsBs
h 
+ (1+rD)D
h
 + (1+rh)Sh-(1+r) sPsBs
h
-(1+rD)D
h 
 Where W1  for her initial endowment of the consumption good, f +b for respectively 
profits of the firm and of the bank  (distributed to the consumer-stockholder at t=2).  
B
h
 denotes for securities, D
h
 for bank deposits.  S h  denotes for savings.  r,  rD , rh  are 
interest rates  paid by securities, deposits  and savings.  For each future state of the world 
s (s) one can determine the price P s  the contingent claim that pays one unit of 
accounts in state s and nothing otherwise. 
The consumer has a well-defined set of desires (”preference”), which can be 
represented by a numerical utility function.  In addition, we assume that the consumer 
chooses optimally, in the sense that they choose the option with the highest utility of 
those available to them.  It implies that a consumer is solving an optimization problem.  
An optimization problem has three key components.  
 
a. Selected object   The consumer chooses her consumption profile (C1 , C2 ) and 
allocation of her savings Sh between bank deposits Dh and securities B
h
.  If real assets Sh - 
sPsBs
h
 – Dh is non-negative, it implies real assets are sufficient to support the 
household economy.  
 
b. The objective function The consumer maximizes her utility function .  is assumed 
to be increasing and concave.  Notice that preferences are contingent states and do not 
fit the standard Von Neumann-Morgenstern representation.  Incompleteness of 
preference becomes apparent that decision makers cannot make a decision in the 
ambiguous situation.  However, even though one individual or one factor doesn’t decide, 
the regulator decides the policy with a foretaste of what is to come after annual closing 
accounts. 
 
c. Constraints 
 
Cash-in-advance   0D h W1, The paper will be based on the Cash-in-advance 
constraint.  This approach that was introduced by Clower (1967) is the requirement 
that each consumer or firm must have sufficient available cash before they can buy 
goods. 
 
 
Price of security h under Uncertainty  sPsBs
h  
(resp.  sPsBs
f,  sPsBs
b
) implies the 
price of securities by the absence of arbitrage opportunities.  A bank issues (or buys) a 
security h (intepreted as a deposit or a loan) characterized by the array Bs
h 
(s)  (resp. Bs
f, 
Bs
b
) of each payoff in all future states of world  
 
Interior Solution   The consumer’s program (Ph) has an interior solution only when 
interest rates are equal: r = r D   
 
Preference of Savings   In the Arrow-Debreu model, money is redundant in the 
market.  Households are indifferent about the composition of savings.  In the paper, the 
household has preference to increase the budget to collect savings Sh and affected by risk 
levels of securities, deposits and real assets.  Savings Sh is the sum of Securities  sPsBs
h  
, Deposits Dh and Real Assets Sh-( sPsBs
h 
+Dh).
  
 
d. Arguments 
 
There are concerns about savings that are substituted into consumption by the 
household like Covas-Fujuta (2010).  Diaz (2005) adds no capital requirement at basics 
to reduce consumption and increase savings by the household.  Haslag (2001) assumed 
that return to money is positively related to the money growth rate that is a random 
variable, gross real returns to savings are random.  His realized gross real return to 
savings indicates that the gross real return to savings is a weighted sum of capital and 
fiat money (which derives its value from government regulation or law, so called as ’fiat 
currency’).  The weight is the share of agent’s asset. 
In the Waller model (2004), Savings are very passively selected by the household 
depending upon decisions at the previous period.  Middle-aged agents have already 
earned their wage income, as the wage during period t was determined by the previous 
period’s interest rates (a level of the capital stock).  Also, they have already decided how 
much to consume and save (since savings are a fixed fraction of wage income), but they 
have not yet decided how to allocate their savings between capital and fiat currency.  
What these middle aged agents want at this point is just the highest possible interest rate 
between period t and t + 1, so that they can obtain the best possible return on their 
savings and can thus consume as much as possible during their period of old age.  In the 
third period of life, retired agents consume their savings and exit the model. 
Practically, Christensen-Meh-Moran (2011, Bank of Canada) mentioned, at the 
timing of events, households deposit savings at banks that use these funds as well as their 
own net worth to finance the entrepreneur’s projects.  In the investment frame, exiting  
(failing to return from the project) agents sell their capital for consumption goods and 
surviving agents buy this capital as part of their consumption-savings decision. 
However, in reality, even though the agent has a house, they need to spend 
expenditure for renting, maintenance and extension of houses.  Savings and real asset 
portion are large enough to make the loan from banks.  It is hard to explain price 
fluctuation of houses and savings on the economy by depending upon the interest rate 
of capital stock and deposit, or perfect substitution of consumption.  For households, the 
preference of savings is the matter about existence of household economy making future 
benefits and directly affecting to the welfare of any individual. 
House-price appreciation by the model of Goodhart-Kashrap-Tsomocos (2012) is 
impressive.  Reducing deposit defaults induces more savings circulated by the bank and 
less self-insurance and by the end, the reduction in self-insurance reduces the number of 
houses for sale in a good state, which means that house-price appreciation in the boom 
is higher than otherwise.  Most of all, the market incompleteness with deadweight costs 
of default distorts the housing market.  Wealthy agents endowed with houses make their 
saving decisions accounting for the possibility that deposits will not be fully repaid.  
When default penalties for banks are low, then households internalize risks putting less 
wealth into the banking system and hold more in the form of houses.  This choice 
increases the supply of houses that is available in boom, which lowers house prices and 
raise welfare for agents entering the housing market at that time.  To insure that house 
price reduction in the bad state of the world, households P and F are also presumed to 
have lower wealth.  Likewise, the non-bank is endowed with lower capital in period 1 as 
well as in the bad state of the world.  This model describes the house bubble 
phenomenon interestingly. 
In the model of Lucas (1995), to support the incompleteness of markets, he 
pointed out savings that the young split their savings between bank deposits, which 
promise a fixed nominal return, and a bank equity, which yields an uncertain real 
dividend.  In addition, because a constant fraction of initial wealth is saved, there is no 
distortion due to fixed nominal interest payments on deposits.  Hence regardless of 
deposits, the bank equity is related to the real effect of monetary policy.  
In the paper, at the framework of securities, deposits and real assets with savings, 
firstly, the relation between savings and real assets (especially houses) can be much more 
attached.  Secondly, deposits included in the total saving amount which are escaped 
from the one-sided thinking that deposits are equal to savings and can be perfectly 
substituted to consumption.  Thirdly, Securities at uncertainty are affecting to the 
investment portfolio of households.  These dynamics are explained by the following 
academical detail. 
Households choose (C1 , C2 , S1 , S2 , R1) taking prices (W1 , W2 ) as given. 
Formally, if we consider the 4-factor model containing banks, because banks have the 
special financial structure having deposits as liabilities and loans as assets, we need to 
have the different mindset from generally accepted accounting principles about debit  and 
credit  accounts.  The general equilibrium (GE) diagram is similar with the balance sheet.  
Distinguishably, the money flow in the paper starts at the bank transaction which is 
“deposits and borrowings” as liabilities and “claims to corporate” as assets.          
Then, deposits of household are the amount to be accumulated in banks.  
Conveniently, riskier investments than deposits for household are categorized as 
securities. 
Savings are moving in the real household economy by capital circulation of 
securities, deposits and real assets.  In addition, the welfare of each household is moving 
from dynamics of accumulated savings.  In the overlapping generation model, wealth is 
always given and manages the household economy easily by each generation.  In reality, 
one who didn’t get a house as a legacy, she should spend quite a long time to have a 
house or rent a house.  Attention about fundamental wealth related to non-working 
capital of a household economy should be emphasized.  If the consumer spends his 
income entirely, the total amount W1  may be spent totally and can be bounded.  In this 
manner, the household always has their fundamental welfare to manage the household 
economy and consumption can be naturally deduced from the framework of household 
economy.  That is, W1  is the budget constraint and the market information is 
incomplete so we cannot deduce the real variable of consumption in reality.  W1  and 
incompleted market information are not enough to deduce the real variable of 
consumption.  In terms of the working capital, we are not so surprised to know that 
capital has various liquidities.  For example, a household wants to spend money on a daily 
basis but should reduce the amount of money by spending it to have fundamental living 
basis like houses.  In the paper, the financial budget constraint is bounded within the W1  
except for S1  because S1 is the summation of securities, deposits and real assets.  These 
are vital factors to operate household economy related to financial markets.  The working 
capital concept at the household economy is evoked within the general equilibrium in the 
paper.  In the perspective that the industrial characteristics of banks mainly operated by 
capital, it makes sense to us that consideration about the household economy should be 
balanced with the working capital concept of banks. 
Then, why we need to define return R1  in this model?  Simply, we think of three 
variables of W for endowment, S for savings and C for consumption.  We assume that 
the concept of the golden-rule saving rate in Chapter 1 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin, n 
denotes for the constant exogenous population growth rate, and d is for the constant 
exogenous rate of depreciation of capital.  We know the house saving rate is 5% (usually 
2-11%, OECD, Economic Outlook n.91, June 2012).  The amount of savings in the 
economy should grow as population grows.  To support this insured saving amount 
caused by population growth, the return should be enough to make profits to cover the 
insurance expense in the economy with the general equilibrium (GE) perspective.  Then, 
we can assume the worst scenario like a bank-run case.  Even though the fix amount of 
saving deposits is secured, the loss amount induced from total savings by the end - 
insured savings will go to the consumption part.  In this overall perspective of an 
equilibrium, insuring savings of households seems plausible to support the economy of 
households, yet it requires further understanding about the profitable dynamic 
mechanism to operate the economic cycle.  I would say the original form is mainly 
based on the BCR general equilibrium model diagram presenting as the balance-sheet 
format as it can be because on-balance-sheet factors are reflected by two regards  - the 
money flow perspective  (profit) and the economic status perspective  (net  present 
value). 
 
Original form (savings containing real assets) 
Max (C1, C2) 
C1 +  sPsBs
h  
+ D
h 
+ Sh - sPsBs
h
 – Dh = W1 
C2 = f +b+(1+r) sPsBs
h 
+ (1+rD)D
h
 + (1+rh)Sh-(1+r) sPsBs
h
-(1+rD)D
h 
 
Simplified form for calculation (savings containing real assets) 
Max (C1, C2) 
C1=W1-S1 
C2=R1+W2-(1+r)S1-S2 
 
We have the first order condition of consumption at period 1 and 2 as below. 
𝐿
C1
 =  ’(C1, C2) -   = 0 
𝐿
C2
 =  ’(C1, C2) -  = 0 
 
We know the Lagrange multiplier is 0 as  = 0, by the 
𝐿
S1
, the first order condition 
of savings at period 1 and by the 
𝐿
𝑅1
, the first order condition of return from initial 
investment.  In addition, we get (1+r1) = 0 by the 
𝐿
S1
, the first order conditon of savings 
at period 1. 
Therefore, what is get from checking the first order condition of household 
problem is that households consume today or tomorrow regardless of a banking money 
flow and it is not affected by the return of initial savings. ’(C1, C2) = 0 denotes as time 
indifference about consumption preference.  Households operate the household economy 
related to banks regardless of consumption for today or tomorrow.  We conclude 
consumption choice is not affected by return of initial savings r1 at the frame of 
banking money flow related to household. 
The house expense portion in deposits held with MFIs (Monetary Financial 
Institutions) is the asset that can induce the future benefit and considered as priority to 
invest for a long time.  For example, among loans to households of MFIs (5231 billion 
euros), loans for house purchase are 74%, 3858.1 billion euros in 2013.  Note that we 
focus on the money transaction started from the bank balance sheet, in the concept of 
savings, House fee is deduced from Sh-sPsBs
h
-Dh Where h is the period of household. 
If we suppose the house fee is not contained in savings as below. 
 
Simplified form for calculation (savings without real assets) 
Max (C1, C2) = 0 
C1 +  1P1B1
h  
+ D1 = W1 
R1+C2+(1+r) 1P1B1
h 
+ (1+r1)D
1
-(1+r) -2P2B2
h
-D2=W2 
Also, C1 = (W1 –S1)+(S1-  1P1B1
h  
+ D1 
 
The first-order condition 
𝐿
C1
 =  ’(C1, C2) -  = 0 
𝐿
C2
 =  ’(C1, C2)-  = 0 
𝐿
D1
  = 0  
𝐿
D1
 -  (1+r1) = 0 
𝐿
D2
  = 0  ’(C1, C2)=0 
𝐿
 1P1B1h
 -  (1+r1) = 0 
𝐿
 1P1B1h
  = 0 
𝐿
r1
  =  ( 1P1B1
h  
+ D1) = 0 
 
In conclusion, ’(C1, C2)=0 (time  indifference about  consumption preference) is 
the same condition regardless of real assets whether it is contained in savings or not. 
Consumption choice is not affected by the interest rate r1 for initial savings 
(same condition  regardless  of real assets whether  is contained in savings or not) and 
summation of securities  and deposits 1P1B1
h
+D1.  Evidently, this condition 
appears in this banking model when we ignore real assets which is most stable in the 
household economy and can be interpreted as the big portion expense and the 
intangible asset producing future benefits.  Therefore, with the condition that real assets 
are contained in savings, we can explain the house economy affected by the proportion 
of securities and deposits. 
First intention to choose the general equilibrium model in the paper is to offer 
understandable method to the academic field and professional field.  In the practice, the 
reserve bank has many methods and even they want more methods together in the 
weighted way.  As I can do, I am intending to use real variables than random variables and 
a lot of Lagrange methods which is very general way to use the general equilibrium.  The 
saving composition matter is more specifically supported by the following empirical 
data. 
The deposit amount traded is different depending upon factor composition of 
economic models.  For example, the European Central Bank announces the Euro areas’ 
deposit amounts for the 4th quarter in 2013 in the Euro areas. Gross saving amount of 
households is 2521.3 billion euros (growth rate:  2.4).  Deposits by non-financial 
corporations are 1870.7 billion euros.  (growth rate: 6.7).  Deposits by Insurance 
corporations and pension funds (financial intermediaries) are 653.2 billion euros.  
(growth rate:  -5.3).  Deposits by other financial intermediaries are 1854.1 billion euros 
(growth rate  -3.1).  Deposits by government are 440.8 billion euros (growth rate:  -1.8).  
Deposits by non-euro area residents are 2522.9 billion euros (growth rate:  -11.2).  
Therefore, without consideration about deposits by non-financial corporations (1870.7), 
the comparison between deposits by household  (2521.3) and deposits  by financial 
intermediaries (653.2+1854.1=2507.3) is naive explanation.   
Loans for house purchase is 3858.1 billion euros.  (growth  rate:  0.7).  It is Long-
term liability affecting the existence of household economy.  In addition, the total  
(7341.7) of deposits by insurance corporations, pension funds (653.2, -5.3), other 
financial intermediaries (1854.1, -3.1), non-financial corporations (1870.7), government 
(440.8), non-euro area residents  (2522.9) are.  Also, total (7752.2) of deposits by 
household  (2521.3, 2.4) and Loans for house purchase (3858.1, 0.7) and other loans 
(796.7, -1.6), consumer credit  (576.1, -3.0) are. 
 
 
Loans for house purchase  
(3858.1, 0.7) 
other loans (796.7, -1.6) 
consumer credit (576.1, -3.0) 
 
 
total 7341.7 
(billion euros, growth rate) 
insurance corporations and pension funds 
(653.2, -5.3) 
other financial intermediaries (1854.1, -3.1) 
non-financial corporations are (1870.7, 6.7) 
government (440.8, -1.8) 
non-euro area residents (2522.9, -11.2) 
total 7752.2 
Empirical balance when the capital of a household economy is concerned   
Ref: European Central Bank,  the 4th quarter in 2013 
 
Savings Sh are the sum of Securities  sPsBs
h
, Deposits Dh, Real assets  Sh - 
sPsBs
h
 – Dh.  Households try to control the balance of assets and liabilities because in 
the situation of uncertainty, to maintain enough Deposits Dh for the economic existence 
of households, households need to invest on securities as of sPsBs
h
 posed on 
uncertainty conditions.  Mainly, real assets imply the budget for houses which can afford 
to manage the residence and invested real assets.  For example, if the household has an 
apartment and there is the redundancy after spending the investment on securities and 
deposits, it can be the maintenance fee for house decoration or big furniture purchases. 
The importance of portion for houses is considerable.  Otherwise, if real assets are 
negative, hence, savings of households are less than the amount of securities and deposits.  
Even though, the amount of operation in the household is enough with securities and 
deposits.  In the conservatism on the house budget, we can consider the effect on 
housing.  In the paper, Houses of households is considered as future economic assets that 
support each member of households to make productions. 
Through the general equilibrium approach, the link from the bank problem to the 
household problem is naturally connected.  Also, the following technical finding by usage 
of same accounts at the household problem induces direction of regulation on banks like 
the portfolio analysis and initial GDP consideration.  The following are technical findings 
with saving preference.  
 
 
Suppose that  s G, B, G=Good, B=Bad.  In the case 1, risk aversion is a s 
below. (resp. risk-taking case) 
 
= G, B, C1+sPs=BBs=B
h
+D
h
+Sh-sPs=GBs=G
h
-D
h
=W1 
 
In this case, portfolio analysis should be detected by regulation because the 
situation can be changed depending on the status.  
In the case 2, incompleteness preference can be considered. 
 
= G, B, no choice, no choice can be selected by the choquet expectation CE((x)) = 
mincore() E((x)) where core() = S : (A)  (A) for all AS 
C1+0+D
h
+Sh-0-D
h
=W1 and D
h 
offset, hence C1+
𝐶2
1+𝑟ℎ
=W 
 
Initial GDP is caused by partition of initial endowment that is combination of 
consumption set.  Hence, regulation direction is originated from initial GDP in this case.  
 
2.  Borrowing composition of Firms - Additional session is in the Part IV.6 
 
The firm chooses its investment level I and its financing (through Real 
Assets sPsBs
h 
+ Dh, Liabilities to banks sPsBs
h 
+ Dh -Lfr (Or Liabilities to 
central banks Lfr) in a way that maximizes its profit: 
 
Max f (P f) 
f =(I)+rf (sPsBs
h
+ Dh)-rL
bank
(Dh+
 sPsBs
h
-Lfr)-rL
fr
Lfr 
I=Sh=Dh+sPsBs
h
 
 
Where   denotes the production function of the representative firm.  r is the premium  
of firm’s real assets.  rL
bank
,  rL
fr
 are interest rates  on bank  loans and federal reserve 
bank  loan.  Dh denotes for bank deposits.  Bh denotes for securities.  Especially Bfr denotes 
for securities of federal reserve banks.  Lfr are loans claimed by the firm to the federal 
reserve bank.  For each future state of the world s (s), one can determine the price Ps 
of the contingent claim that pays one unit of accounts in a state s and nothing otherwise.  
I  is the investment level and S h  denotes for savings. 
 
   Interior Solution  P  has an interior  solution  only when:  r= rL
bank
=rL
fr
 
 
The Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem projects a theme of a theorem on capital 
structure. The basic theorem states that, under a certain market  price process (the  
classical random  work) and an efficient market, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs and asymmetric information, the value of a firm is unaffected by how 
that firm is financed.  Firms are indifferent about the composition of borrowings.  Given 
the proposition II of the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem, a higher debt-to-equity ratio  
leads to a higher required  return on equity  because of the higher risk involved for 
equity-holders in a company with debt.  rE=r0+
𝐷
𝐸
 (r0-rD) where rE is the required rate of 
return on equity or cost of equity, r0 is the company unlevered cost of capital (ie. Assume 
no leverage, rD is the required rate of return on borrowings or cost of debt and 
𝐷
𝐸
 is the 
debt-to-equity ratio under two assumptions: (1) no transaction costs exist. (2) individuals 
and corporations borrow at the same rates.  However, on the surface, given same ratios of 
𝐷
𝐸
, two different sized banks are distortly intepreted.  Even though this proposition is 
induced in the absence of the bankruptcy costs, merges of banks like “too big to fail”, so 
called “the size game among big banks, are considerable.  Thus it is certainly worth 
inquiring D+E behind it’s apparent dynamics of 
𝐷
𝐸
. 
The BCR model provides a key with which to unlock riddles of firms’ borrowing 
compositions.  The borrowing composition of firms imparted dynamics with the 
preference to maintain Real Assets sPsBs
h 
+ Dh.  Regardless of equilibrium, firms 
prefer to loan from central banks (so called as bonds) than commercial banks.  Among the 
Dh and sPsBs
h
, Firms prefer to have Dh because of financial stability and preference 
about certainty.  The model reflects the tendency of banks toward the big size with Real 
Assets.  In the economic existence respect of banks, banks have responsibility to operate 
the dynamics of the debt-to-equity ratio 
𝐷
𝐸
 and maintain the economic entity of Real Assets 
D+E in the economy of countries. 
Given the firm’s problem, we have ambiguity about change of firms because of 
investments or loan status.  Precise explanation about the relation with commercial banks 
and central banks should be offered.  In the general equilibrium (GE), firms choose labor 
cost and manage the capital for production or business process but labor effect is hard to 
be clarified with certain connection of commercial banks and federal banks.  Hence, the 
transaction like loan movements (i.e.  liabilities to banks,  liabilities  to central banks,  
investments) can be selected to explain  in this paper.  Additionally, Investments is 
regarded as Real assets to support existence of business entities.  It implies firms want to 
acquire investment budget to maintain real assets that can be requisite for existence of 
firms.  Therefore, by having borrowing preference to have much more stability between 
liabilities  to banks  and central banks  (so called as bonds),  firms pursue  to obtain  
stability to acquire  the investment up to the stability of Investments which can be equal 
to Real Assets.  Thus, we can explain dynamics of investments and loans with the firm’s 
property. 
There are many arguments to explain the ambiguity of firms with informational 
asymmetry, shock absorbed by effective capitals, securities, technical shocks, and interest 
rates on loans and borrowing constraints. 
Boyd-Chang-Smith (2004) points out two informational asymmetry problems of 
firms: The moral hazard problem arises because any borrower’s project choice is not 
observable.  Also, the costly state verification (CSV) problem arises because, for either 
type of projects, the return of investments cannot be freely observed by any agent other  
than  the project  owner. 
In the Nelson-Pinter (2012) model, at the production function of cobb-douglas 
standard form, there is a shock variable to the quality of physical capitals.  When we face 
the unanticipated exogenous declines in the productive capacity of physical capitals, 
available “Effective capitals” for use in the production is diminished.  This intends to 
consider the effect on banks since banks hold claims on physical capitals directly on their 
balance sheets, this will be loss for banks, which must be absorbed or passed on to outside 
creditors. 
In the Dewatripont-tirole (2012) model, he argues that securities are 
characterized not only by income rights but also by control rights.  Optimal corporate 
choices are t h e  time- inconsistency.  Investors in control of corporate choices must face 
an incentive that differs from firm-value maximization.  So a banking manager has no 
financial resources to cover an investment cost and turns to investors for financing.  The 
capital structure - that is, the allocation among investors of contingent cash-flow and 
control rights  - is designed at this financial stage. 
Covas Fujita (2010) mentioned that the technology shock is distributed as 
standard normal distribution.  Labor and capital rental markets are assumed to be 
competitive. 
Diaz (2005) thinks that since interest rates on loans are greater or equal than the 
discount rate,  firms prefer to use internal  sources (i.e.  cash flows) rather than  external  
financing.  In addition, he induces that capital depreciation is paid out of firm’s cash 
flow and net investment is entirely financed with debting.  In the model of Nuno-
Thomas (2013), they assumed that the firm can only borrow from banks located on the 
same island. 
In the static model of general equilibrium (GE), if we know the GDP endowment 
as the exogenous factor, we can calculate more at the firm’s problem.  Indeed, the 
analysis about GDP like Consumption to GDP, Government Expenditure to GDP, Fixed 
Capital Formation to GDP, Export to GDP, Net Export to GDP, Money to GDP  except  
for inflation  rate  and nominal  interest rate  are used with the general equilibrium  (GE)  
approach. 
The effort to figure out ambiguity of firms and overall perspective analysis 
display a coherent structural and compositional understanding.  Then, how we can 
measure the firm’s productivity relating to the banking area in general equilibrium (GE)?  
The classical viewpoint that there are three basic factors of production, (land, labor and 
capital) at the production function.  Total-factor productivity (TFP) is different from 
the traditional calculation measured by inputs of labor and capital.  The TFP 
calculation is measured as a Solow residual affecting in total output and not caused by 
inputs.  The equation Y  = A × K α × Lβ  in Cobb-Douglas form represents total output 
(Y) as a function of total-factor productivity (A), capital input  (K), labor input  (L), and 
the two inputs’ respective  shares of output (α and β are the capital  input share of 
contribution for K and L respectively).  The problem is that units of A do not admit a 
simple economic interpretation.  We have two ways to calculate TFP (Chen, 2011).  
Firstly, we obtain the TFP measurement by estimating a production function.  Secondly, 
we establish a model to find the determinant of TFP and uncover whether financial 
factors exert any effects on TFP.  Materials and energy are secondary factors because they 
are from land, labor and capital. 
It can be puzzled whether duplicated or missed amounts are existed in the 
general equilibrium (GE).  The equity portion as capitals is in the liabilities of firms and 
the wage portion as expense is in the eliminated account of firms.  With this production 
function measure, we are talking about the exact asset amount of firms that is the part of 
equity at the same time.  Let’s go back to the definition of the production function.  
Factors of production are inputs to the production process.  Finished goods are the 
output and the relationship of input and output is the production function.  The 
important point is that we cannot exaggerate too much about money.  Indeed, the 
classical viewpoint is that money is not contained in capital because it is not directly 
produce any good so it is hard to be related to consumptions of goods at the problem of 
household. 
In the paper, firstly, we are focusing on “capital” including the “financial 
capital.” Financial capital is raised to operate and expand a business and it is net worth  
(assets minus liabilities) including money borrowed from others.  Originally, “Capital” 
means goods that can help produce other goods in the future, the result of investment. 
Considering a labor is not realistic because the number of employees at the firm is hard 
to be considered at the banking problem.  Already we consider equity (asset-liability) is 
the result after considering labor cost.  Redundant firm size variable can evoke the 
biased information if we pursue obtain the general equilibrium (GE) in this model.  It’s 
true that wage is the large portion of input at the firm and should be considered 
distinguishably.  However, for the special industry like banking, we need to clarify 
needed variables to figure out the problem in the academic field for future and in the 
realistic world for present. 
If we contain banks and federal banks in the banking model, we add the real asset 
variable.  It implies the capital concept is naturally inducing the working capital concept.  
Adding the shock variable to the quality of physical capital (Nelson-Pinter 2012, Gertler-
Karadi 2011, Gertler-Kiyotaki 2010) is hard to be measured and needed to be predicted 
with a lot of unexpected uncertain situation. 
Also, the conservative business cycle is deduced.  If we assume that multiplier µ 
exists, (Dh+Bh)Dh+Bh-L
frLfr.  This assumption exactly reflects the preference of 
safetier capital type like real assets > a government bond (lower interest rate on a bond 
than  a loan) > a loan.  
 
3. Demand Deposit of Bank  
 
Scope of Bank  Domestically chartered commercial banks, country branches and 
agencies of foreign banks,  Edge Act corporation. 
The bank chooses its supply of loans to firms D h +B f r +L f r ,  its demand for 
deposits Dh, and the borrowing Bfr-Lfr in a way that maximized its profit: 
 
Max b (Pb) 
b = rL
Bank 
(Dh+sPsBs
h
-Lfr) - rLfr  (sPsBs
fr
-Lfr) – r
D
D
h 
 
where  rL
Bank
, rLfr  are interest rates on bank loans and federal reserve bank loan.  Dh 
denotes for bank deposits.  RD is the interest rate paid by deposits.  Bs
h
 denotes for securities.  
Especially Bs
fr
 denotes for securities of federal reserve banks.  Lfr are loans claimed by the 
firm to the federal reserve bank. 
The bank maximizes the profit by choosing its supply of loans L
+
, its demand for 
deposits D
-
 and the issuance sPsBs
b. 
 
Max b (Pb) 
b = rLL
+ 
+ r sPsBs
b– rDD- L+  = sPsBs
b
+D
- 
 
The part of banks’ problem provides a context which capital circulation within 
banks is required by other main factors of economy.  The problem of banks is presented 
without equities of banks in fairly balanced debits and credits of banks.  This main issue 
has been to handle the demand deposit in the banking area and it related to the money 
supply closely.  In the data of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, demand 
deposit and money stock data have been collected from Demand Deposit, Currency and 
Related items (J.3, Semi monthly) in 1960 to Money Stock Measures in 2012. 
Under the fractional reserve banking, deposit is important indicator for economy 
because of money multiplier effect.  In the formula of moneysupply=currency+deposits, 
demand deposit which has highest liquidity among deposits on the balance sheet of banks 
is directly related to the M1 of central banks.  Diamond and Dybvig model (1983) 
explains why bank runs occur at an undesirable equilibrium and why banks issue 
demand deposits that are more liquid than their assets by providing better risk sharing 
among people who need to consume at different random times.  The key to describe the 
rationality both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs is the 
illiquidity of assets, especially by the demand deposit.  His conclusion on the bank runs 
as better indicator of economic distress than money supply is too quick because there is 
the duplicated section of deposits and money supply.  A bank run is the sudden 
withdrawal of deposits of just one bank and money supply contains the currency section. 
In case of bank runs, the government of country should prepare the recovery 
solution for economy.  Regularly, given information about money supply, the government 
can figure out about both moving of currency and deposits. Krugman (2006) points this 
out that deposits are usually considered part of the narrowly defined money supply, as 
they can be used, via checks and drafts, and a means of payment for goods and services 
and to settle debts.  The money supply of a country is usually held to consist of currency 
plus demand deposits.  In most countries, demand deposits account for a majority of the 
money supply.  To explain the correlation between deposit  (demand deposit) and money 
supply, bank runs can be interpreted as the sudden constraint of deposit and money 
supply.  We research on indicators of economic crisis so economic crisis is not the 
indicator to analyze the status of economy. 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) assume that the uniqueness of demand deposits 
roles as a desirable medium of exchange so the existence of demand for privately 
produced riskless trading securities induces issuing demand deposits by banks.  Actually, 
under the fractional reserve banking, a bank deposit is not a bailment that implies 
physical possession of personal property.  It moves safely upon the banking revenue 
process. 
Firstly, the property of customer was deposited.  In turn, the customer receives an 
asset called the deposit account.  Finally, the deposit account is the liability of the bank 
on its balance sheet.  On the balance sheet of Liabilities of all commercial banks in the 
United States  (2014.01), 70% is the deposit account.  The circulation of deposits is 
important in economy.  David Vanhoose (2010) categories the deposit into three sections 
like transaction deposit, large-denomination time deposit, saving deposits and small-
denomination time deposits, at the United States commercial bank liability and equity 
capital. Transaction deposit contains non-interest-bearing demand deposits.  Transaction 
deposit is 6% among total liabilities and equity capital of bank balance sheet. 
Dewatripont-Tirole (2012) points out that deposit insurance is the prevention of 
banks runs following the Diamond-Dybvig (1983).   
s 
In the model of Boyd-Chang-Smith (2004), even though project return is safe 
because of a large number of borrowers, he assumes possibility for banks to fail.   
Regardless of a single borrower and aggregate of borrower, potential bankers can 
suggest needless to operate the bank.   
In the model of Covas-Fujita (2010), the bank can raise funds through either 
deposits or equity so holding equity involves the equity issuance cost.  
Diaz model (2005) also tries to select the considerable sources.  For example, 
firms only source of financing is bank lending the bank can claim the full amount of 
firm’s cash flow.  The  equity of banks moves under upper limit of dividend (under the 
hypothesis that the bank can turn equity into dividend with restriction) because of 
balance sheet constraint.  
Goodhart-Kashrap-Tsomocos (2012) mentioned shadow banking.  The 
securitized loans, called mortgage backed securities (MBS) can be sold to the non-bank 
and the non-bank will finance the purchase with a repo loan from the bank (that will 
have the MBS as collateral)  
 
4. Federal Reserve Banks and general equilibrium (GE) 
 
The Federal Reserve Bank chooses its investment level I and its financing (through 
real assets Dh+sPsBs
h
, Liabilities to bank Dh+sPsBs
h
-Lfr (or Liabilities to central bank 
Lfr) in a way that maximizes its profit: 
Max b (Pb) 
f = f (I) + rf (Dh+sPsBs
h
) - rL
Bank
 (Dh +sPsBs
fr
-Lfr) – r
 
L 
fr 
Lfr 
I=Sh 
Where  denotes the production function of the representative firm.  rf  is the 
premium  of firm’s real assets.  r L
Bank
, rL
fr 
are interest rates  on bank  loans and federal 
reserve bank  loan.  Dh denotes for bank deposits.  B
h  
denotes for securities.  Especially B
fr
 
denotes for securities of federalreserve banks.  Lfr are loans claimed by the firm to the 
federal reserve bank.  For each future state of the world s (s ∈ ω), one can determine the 
price Ps of the contingent claim that pays one unit of account in state s and nothing 
otherwise.  I is the investment level and Sh denotes for savings. 
 
Interior Solution   Pf has an interior solution only when: rf = rL
Bank
 = rL
fr
   
 
5. General Equilibrium (GE) 
 
General equilibrium (GE) is characterized by a vector of interest rates (r, rD,  rh, rf,, 
rL
Bank
, rL
fr
) and three vectors of demand and supply levels (C 1, C2,   sPsBs
h
, D
h
) for the 
consumer, (I, sPsBs
h
, D
h
, Lfr) for the firm, (Lfr,  sPsBs
h
, Dh, sPsBs
fr
) for the bank and 
(Dh, sPsBs
h
, Lfr) for federal reserve banks. 
Each agent behaves optimally. (i.e., his or her decisions solve Ph, Pf or Pb respectively. 
 
Each market clearing 
I=S (Good market) 
Dh (Firm) - Dh (Firm) + Dh (Household) - Dh (Household) + Dh (Bank) - Dh (Bank) 
(Deposit market) 
Lfr (Firm) - Lfr (Firm) - Lfr (Bank) + Lfr (Firm) + Lfr (FR:Federal Reserve Banks) - Lfr 
(FR) (Credit Market) 
Bs
h 
(Firm) - Bs
h
 (Firm) + Bs
h 
(Household) - Bs
h
 (Household) + Bs
fr
 (Bank) - Bs
fr
 (Bank) + Bs
fr
 
(FR) - Bs
fr
 (FB) (Financial market) 
 
It is clear in this model that the only possible equilibrium is such that all 
interest rates are equal: r = r L = r D   
 
 
 
(result) Arrow (1953) 
 
If firms and households have unrestricted access to perfect financial markets, 
then  at the competitive equilibrium,  banks  make zero profit and the size and 
composition  of balance  sheet (banks)  have no impact  on other  economic agents. 
 
(result) Cho (2014) 
 
If some accumulated variables are not negative, for example, the components 
Investment I, Savings S h , L f r  are not negative, there is the equilibrium in the economy 
and the existence of each factors like firms, Househoulds,  Banks, Federal  Reserve Banks  
is fulfilled.  The size of banks is affecting on each agent because equity capitals depend 
on previous deposits  (additional explanation in Part IV, 7).  Depending the change of 
bank size influencing on total deposits Dh , the liability of firms is affected by liabilities to 
banks D h +sPsBs
fr
-Lfr , deposits  of household Dh  and real assets of households and 
firms.  This is supported by the following the process of equity capital multiplication. 
 
  
 
 
 
Part IV Effects of Equity Capital Regulation 
 
6. Additional explanation about the borrowing composition of firm’s problem – The 
portfolio composition effected by the minimum equity capital regulation. 
 
In the model of Kahane  (1977), the minimum capital requirement causes an 
unintended result:  it worsened, rather than improved the intermediary’s condition and 
increases its probability of ruin.  He checks this calculation with the ruin constraint and 
given standard deviation of rate of return at the portfolio composition of liability, stock 
and bonds. 
In this paper, with the portfolio of risky portfolio and stable portfolio, explanation 
will be easier to be understood why minimum equity regulation induces for banks to 
operate riskier portfolio.  In addition, it intends to reduce pro-cyclicality (to the 
financial shocks) and promote the countercyclical buffer. 
If we assume that the bank manages a risky portfolio with an expected rate of 
return of 17% and a standard deviation of 27%. The expected rate of return on equity is 
7% and even though, there is pressure to raise the required equity every period, liability is 
same every period.  The bank tries to meet the bank capital condition regulated by 
financial intermediaries so the bank should operate much more risky portfolio comparing 
to the previous period as following. 
 
Effects of increasing the equity at the portfolio composition 
Period Required Equity, Liability Portfolio  composition 
  (risky portfolio,  stable  portfolio) 
1           12 (12%), 88(88%) (-61.6%, 161.6%) 
2              13 (13%), 88(87.12%) (-61 %, 161 %) 
3              14 (14%), 88(86.72%) (-60.4 %, 160.4 %) 
 
 
To calculate the portfolio composition, we calculate  the expected  value (Mean). 
Mean 0.12(12/100) × 0.07 + 0.88 × 0 = 0.0084 
0.1287(13/101) × 0.07 + 0.8712 × 0 = 0.0090 
0.1372(14/102) × 0.07 + 0.8672 × 0 = 0.0096 
 
Suppose that the bank decides to invest in the portfolio having a proportion Y of 
the total investment budget so that the overall portfolio will have an expected rate of 
return as above. 
 
We know an expected rate of return of a risky portfolio Rp is 17% and an 
expected rate of return of a stable portfolio is 7%. Hence, we get the risky portfolio 
proportion Y. 
n 
n = 0 
n = 1 
n = 2 
n = 3 
· · · 
 
n = k 
· · · 
n → ∞ 
Deposits 
D0   = 1 
D1   = (1 − β − K) 
D2   = (1 − β − K)2 
D3   = (1 − β − K)3 
· · · 
Dk = (1 − β − K)k 
· · · 
D∞ = 0 total 
deposits 
    1   
D = 
K + β 
Borrowings 
- 
B1   = (1 − β) 
B2   = (1 − β)(1 − β − K) 
B3   = (1 − β)(1 − β − K)2 
· · · 
Bk = (1 − β)(1 − β − K)k−1 
· · · 
 
B∞ = 0 
total  borrowings 
1 − β 
K + β 
OptimizedEquityCapital 
- 
OEC1 = K 
OEC2 = K(1 − β − K) 
OEC3 = K(1 − β − K)2 
· · · 
OECk = K(1 − β − K)k−1 
· · · 
OEC∞ = 0 
total  optimized  equity  capital 
    K   
K + β 
 
 
Rf + (Rp – Rf)) × Y           Proportion Y 
0.07 + 0.1 × Y  = 0.0084             -0.616 
0.07 + 0.1 × Y  = 0.0090               -0.61 
0.07 + 0.1 × Y  = 0.0096             -0.604 
Thus, in order to obtain a mean return of 0.84%, 0.90%, 0.96%, the bank must 
invest  -61.6%, -61%, -60.4 of total funds in the risky portfolio and 161.6%, 161%, 
160.4% in stable portfolio. 
Standard deviation that implies the probability, to get mean of returns, is also 
increasing. 
  
Standard Deviation 
0.12 × 0.27 = 0.0324 
0.13 × 0.27 = 0.0351 
0.14 × 0.27 = 0.0378 
 
7. Previous deposit affects optimized equity capital  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B =                                           
 
[β = restriction of borrowing] Then, Borrowings can be executed between Deposit 1 and 
Restriction β 
 
[Balance sheet equality constraint]  Dn  = Bn – OECn   
 
Hart and Jaffee (1974) analyzed the properties of the feasible and efficient set with the 
assumption that the initial equity capital is zero (i.e. K=0).  However, it is possible that the 
intermediary’s equity is zero in the substantial degree of leverage (high liabilities to equity 
ratios 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝐷ℎ+𝐵𝑓𝑟+𝐿𝑓𝑟
).  Then, we should assume that the equity is negliglible.  
In the paper as the same as KAHANE (1977), we assume the equity is positive (K  0) so 
that the opportunity set does not pas through the origin (i.e. the vector of Deposit D, Borrowing B, 
Optimized Equity Capital = 0 give an infeasible solution). 
 
Then theoretical superior limit for deposits is defined by the following: 
Deposits = n=0  (1-K-) = 
1
𝐾+
 
 
 
Theoretically, superior limit for the equity capital by the firm is defined by the following: 
OptimizedEquityCapital = K × Deposit = 
𝐾
𝐾+
 
And the theoretical superior limit for total borrowings in banks is defined by the following: 
Borrowings = (1-) × Deposits = 
1−
𝐾+
 
 
The process described above by the geometric series can be represented, where 
Borrowings at stage k are a function of deposits at the precedent stage: 
 
Optimized Equity Capital at stage k is a function of the deposits at the precedent stage:  
OECk = K × Dk−1 
 
Hence, if the optimized equity capital depends on the initial deposit and assume the 
terminal condition of bank is liquidation of bank deposits. 
 
(result) Hence, Optimized Equity Capital depends on the previous deposit. In addition, 
deposit insurance cost also increases because deposit insurance depends on the number of 
household. 
 
Deposits at stage k are the difference between additional borrowings and 
optimized equity capital relative to the same stage:  Dk  = Bk  − OECk 
In the model of Gorton-Winton (1995), bank size is given.  In the theorem of 
Modigliani-Miller, the size and composition of banks’ balance sheets have no impact on 
other agents.  However, as population grows, insured deposits will increase.  Then, the 
bank size should grow so bank size growth concern should be measured.  
 
8. K index for the indicator of risk taking 
 
Define the equity capital ratio with respect to total liabilities and equity capital, 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐷ℎ+𝐵𝑓𝑟−𝐿𝑓𝑟
, K(0,1), the borrowing (from federal banks) ratio 
𝐵𝑓𝑟−𝐿𝑓𝑟
𝐷ℎ+𝐵𝑓𝑟−𝐿𝑓𝑟
, (0,1).  
Suppose the demand for funds is unlimited, by summing up two quantities, the 
theoretical equity capital multiplier is defined as: 
 
k = 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠+𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠+𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 =  
1+𝐾
𝐾+
 
where the equity capital ratio with respect to total liabilities and equity capital, 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐷ℎ+𝐵𝑓𝑟+𝐿𝑓𝑟
 
k is the index to decline to increase the risk at the portfolio of commercial banks.  The 
deposit is fixed at total 1 and borrowings have the constraint cannot be negative value beyond the 
minimum borrowings .  For example, if deposit=1, the minimum of required equity = 10%, 
borrowings = 0.3. 
1+0.1
0.3+0.1
 = 
1.1
0.4
 = 2.75 
 
If the minimum of required equity is raised from 10% to 15%, k index was as below: 
1+0.15
0.3+0.15
 = 
1.15
0.45
 = 2.55 
 
To increase the k index, the bank should increase the deposit beyond the initial 
deposit level (1 in this simulation) or allocate the borrowing portfolio. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
The minimum capital requirement is a necessary condition for banking sector 
stability to raise the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base.  However, 
it has friction with the portfolio management.  By using effects of increasing the equity 
at the portfolio composition, reducing pro-cyclicality (to the financial shocks) and 
promoting the countercyclical buffer are pursued. 
In the Basel 3 system, the risk coverage framework intends to capture all material 
risks by using counterparty credit risk formula weighted on the external rating of the 
counter party.  Exposure measures contain on-balance sheet, repurchase agreements and 
securities finance, derivatives and off-balance sheet (OBS) items.  In the paper, rather 
than enlarging the risk contagion, related factors and risk affection scope are detected 
without overstatement by using the general equilibrium (GE) model and deposit 
affection to the optimized equity capital.  Deposits are in the large portion at the 
household, firm and banks.  To explain risk coverage, by proving correlation of 
optimized equity capital upon the previous deposit level, the paper aims to ensure that 
banking-sector- capital requirements take account of the macro-financial environment in 
which each substantial economic entity operates. 
Basel 3 introduced a minimum leverage ratio.  The leverage ratio was calculated 
by dividing Tier1 capital by the bank’s average total consolidated assets.  In the paper, k 
index is suggested as the indicator of risk taking.  Within the liability, three major 
fractions like deposits, borrowings and optimized equity capital are considered as the 
complementary of minimum capital requirement.  Assets of commercial banks are mainly 
consisted with loans and securities. Because the optimized equity capital grows and 
deposits is restricted by change.  Borrowings that are the difference between asset and 
deposit+equity capital should be checked whether borrowings cover the optimized equity 
by k index or not. 
The combination of portfolio composition test, deposit-equity optimization and k 
index enables bounding the bank capital regulation problems. 
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